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Abstract 
Assessing social benefits in transport policy implementation has been studied by many 
researchers using theoretical or empirical measures. However, few of them measure social benefit using 
different discount rates including the inter-temporal preferences rate of users, the private investment 
discount rate and the inter-temporal preferences rate of the government. In general, the social discount 
rate used is the same for all social actors. Therefore, this paper aims to assess a new method by 
integrating different types of discount rate belonging to different social actors in order to measure the real 
benefits of each actor in the short, medium and long term. A dynamic simulation is provided by a 
strategic Land-Use and Transport Interaction (LUTI) model. The method is tested by optimizing a cordon 
toll scheme in Madrid considering socio- economic efficiency and environmental criteria. Based on the 
modified social welfare function (WF), the effects on the measure of social benefits are estimated and 
compared with the classical WF results as well. The results of this research could be a key issue to 
understanding the relationship between transport system policies and social actors' benefits distribution in 
a metropolitan context. The results show that the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actor 
had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of 
the measure of congestion toll declines more quickly overtime. 
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INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK 
Research on "welfare economics" focuses on the pursuit of the statement "X has higher welfare in 
scenario A rather than B" which implies that "X prefers scenario A to B". This value judgment, innocent 
and independent at first, involves many questions: whose preferences should count? Over what period of 
time? How should these preferences be counted? All these concerns must somehow be integrated into a 
social policy formulation. 
They exists different manner for defining a welfare function. Traditionally, welfare economic 
theory foundation is based on a Net Present Value (NPV) calculation where the time dependent 
preferences of considered agents need to be taken in account. However, the time preferences, remains a 
controversial subject. Currently, the traditional approach employs a unique discount rate for various 
agents. However, this way of discounting appears to be inconsistent with the rhetoric and spirit of 
'sustainable development' (1). New research work suggests that the discount rate may not be a 
homogeneous value. The discount rates may change during time following the individual's preferences. A 
significant body of evidence suggests that people do not behave following a constant discount rate (2), 
(3). In fact, UK Government has quickly recognized the power of the arguments for time-varying rates, as 
it has done in its official guidance to Ministries on the appraisal of investments and policies (4). Other 
authors deal with not just time preference but with uncertainty about future income (precautionary 
saving). In a situation in which economic growth rates are similar across time periods, the rationale for 
declining social optimal discount rates is driven by the preferences of the individuals in the economy, 
rather than expectations of growth (5). However, these approaches have been mainly focused on long-
term policies where intergenerational risks may appear (6), (7). 
The traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) uses a unique discount rate derived from market 
interest rates or investment rates of return for discounting the costs and benefits of all social agents 
included in the CBA (8). However, the costs of opportunity may differ amongst individuals, firms, 
governments, or society in general, as do the returns on savings. In general, the firms or operators require 
an investment rate linked to the current return on savings, while the discount rate of consumers-users 
depends on their time preferences with respect of the current and the future consumption, as well as 
society can take in account the intergenerational well-being, adopting a lower discount rate for today's 
generation. Time discount rate of social actor (users, operators, government and society) places a lower 
value in a future gain and the uncertainty about future income strongly determine the individual 
preferences These time and uncertainty dependent preferences must be integrated into a transport policy 
formulation that has significant social impacts. The use of individual social agent discount rate drives the 
optimization process by a LUTI model more credible. The discount rate of a user cannot be the same than 
the operator's discount rate. The preferences of both are different. 
In addition, another school of thought suggests that people, such as a social group, may have 
different attitudes towards future costs and benefits (9). Particularly, the users have different discount 
rates related to their income. Some research work tried to modify user discount rates using a 
compensating weight which represents the inverse of household income level. The discount rate is 
important in order to make acceptable or not a policy or investment by considering if the discounted value 
of benefits exceeds the discounted value of the costs. Therefore, the economic theory on which welfare 
assessment is based has various implications for investment policies including transport policies (10). 
Congestion, pollution, resource consumption, social exclusion, and deterioration of quality of life 
are some of the problems that authorities must deal with in the coming years due to the intensive and 
continuous growth of car usage. Society finds congestion inefficient and wasteful. Hence, it has been the 
transportation external cost attracting the attention of many economists, engineers and urban planners. 
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Extra travel time has been one of the main motivations for investment in transport infrastructure and 
services. 
One of the measures proposed for road congestion is congestion pricing following the Pigouvian 
thinking of charging for the external costs (11). Congestion pricing has been studied in a very large 
amount of settings: with steady-state congestion models, using queuing models, taking into account 
network equilibrium and considering all sorts of secondary issues such as time-dependent charges (12), 
(13). But from the earliest Walters (14), Vickery (15), UK Ministry of Transport (16), to the most recent 
works (17), (18), (19) one of the main interests has been to define the optimal price in order to maximize 
the social welfare. 
Traditionally, congestion pricing strategy welfare is assessed using a static CBA (20), (21), (22). 
However the analysis of the congestion pricing should take into account interaction between urban 
subsystems (social, environmental, land-use or activity allocations). The integrated approach of transport 
and land-use dynamic systems allows to estimate a social welfare function with respect to the time and 
space when a transport policy is implemented. The optimization of the welfare function is achieved using 
the NPV related to the inter-temporal preferences (i.e. discount rates) of different socials agents included 
in the welfare function. However, the current social welfare functions used in transport policies appraisal 
mainly consider a unique value of discount rate. This paper looks at identifying whether the use of various 
discount rates following social agents' inter-temporal preferences has an effect on the definition of 
optimal strategy of congestion pricing implemented in a metropolitan environment. 
Therefore, following the economic, transport and environmental literature about the variability of 
the discount rates, a new welfare function using different social rates is propounded (23). This approach 
intends to better reflect the real inter-temporal preferences of the single agent, their expected benefits and 
costs. An optimization procedure is implemented over a Land-Use and Transport Interaction model 
(LUTI model) in order to search for the optimal transport strategy. Three time periods (+5, +10 and +20 
years) are studied to evaluate the effects of the planning process at short, medium and long terms. 
This paper is organized as follows: after the introduction and related works presentation, the 
second section defines the methodology based on the simulation and the optimization of a congestion 
pricing based on a LUTI model. The optimization process of the objective function (OF) is detailed in the 
third section. The fourth section describes the case study of the metropolitan area of Madrid and presents 
the congestion pricing scenario to optimize. Section five presents an analysis of results and the 
comparison between the optimization process using welfare functions characterized by the same discount 
rate or by different discount rates related to each agent. This section includes as well a micro-territorial 
analysis. The last section offers conclusions about the impacts in terms of policy recommendations 
derived by the adoption of different welfare functions. 
GENERAL METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK 
The proposed system dynamics (SD) approach consists of linking subsystems of land-use and transport 
using an optimization procedure. Whereas the LUTI model estimates the mobility patterns on the 
scenarios conditioned by exogenous variables and policies, the optimization procedures seek the 
maximum welfare scenario that may be generated through the transport measures that have been 
optimized. Figure 1 shows the interaction between all sub-models, policy instruments, and optimization 
tool. The LUTI model and the optimization procedure are integrated by means of an OF, based on a 
dynamic CBA development. There is also a link between the optimization routine and the LUTI model 
through the transport policies. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION MODEL. 
The core of this procedure deals with the definition of an OF which summarizes policy-makers" 
objectives with respect of economic efficiency, sustainability and equity and includes the utilities of all 
agents (users, operators, governments and society). Finally the OF is a welfare function whose 
optimization depends on the discount rate adopted. In general, the optimization of the welfare function 
considers the same discount rate for all agents included in the welfare function. This paper introduces 
different rates of discount, depending on the time preferences of each agent and compares the results of 
the optimization process using a unique discount rate or different discount rates. The optimal transport 
strategy is defined as the set of transport measures that maximizes the value of this function. 
The LUTI Model 
A strategic, dynamic, and integrated urban land-use and transport model based on MARS (Metropolitan 
Activity Relocation Simulator) statements is used as the framework for policy optimization process (24). 
MARS-Madrid was developed since 2008 (25) and integrates elements of the land-use and the 
transportation systems: the basic underlying hypothesis of MARS is that settlements and activities within 
them are self-organizing systems. The model is based on the principles of systems dynamics (26) and 
synergetic (27). The development of the first MARS dates back to more than 12 years ago, and it was 
partially funded by the European Union research projects (OPTIMA (28), FATIMA (29) and 
PROSPECTS (30)). To date, MARS models have been developed for many European cities (Edinburg, 
Helsinki, Leeds, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, Bari and Vienna), some Asian cities (Chiang Mai and Ubon 
Ratchathani in Thailand, and Hanoi in Vietnam) and in Porto Alegre, Brazil (31). The first application of 
a MARS model in the United States has been recently developed for Washington DC (32). 
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MARS-Madrid was developed to simulate the future development of the land-use and 
transportation over time. The model is able to support policy evaluation and scenario testing over short, 
medium and long-term horizons. It uses the concepts of causal loop diagrams (CLD) from the system 
dynamics, which provide the basis to study the cause and effect among the variables of the transportation 
system and the land-use. The current version of MARS is implemented in Vensim, a System Dynamics 
programming environment based on the analysis of speed vs. O-D demand relationships, and includes 
speed-flow functions that simulate the current transport network. These functions are calibrated for 
Madrid Network with the VISUM® specialized transport modeling. 
The implementation of a LUTI model for evaluating the impacts of transportation policies is a 
major improvement with respect to the use of traditional four-step travel demand models. MARS-Madrid 
includes a land-use component and explicitly simulates the interaction between the transportation system 
components and the relocation of residences and economic activities over time. The direct and complex 
relationship between transportation and the urban activity system (33) sets the basis for the instable 
equilibrium that exists between transportation supply and demand. 
MARS-Madrid includes a transportation model, a housing development model, a household 
location choice model, a workplace development model, and a workplace location choice model. The 
transportation model simulates the travel behavior of the population that lives in each studied area, 
depending on the location of residences and work places. This model uses the concept of a constant travel 
time budget (34). The land-use model simulates the generation and allocation of new housing units and 
the location of workplaces for two main categories, production and services. In addition MARS-Madrid 
can compute energy consumption from transportation and the generation of a set of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and other pollutant emissions produced by transport. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of 
MARS-Madrid Simulator. 
TABLE 1. MAIN FEATURES OF LUTI MODEL 
Model Feature MARS-Madrid Model 










Car, transport public (bus and rail), slow 
OD-specific speed-flow curves for trips V/C ratios) 
In-vehicle time, access/egress time, parking search time, waiting times, transfer 
times, car costs, PT fares 
Commute, others 
Employed population, car ownership, household income 
Simultaneous choice 
Commute trips inelastic. Constant time budget 
Yes 
Pfaffenbichler, Emberger and Shepherd (35) provide additional information on the development 
of the first MARS model, and show how this model was calibrated and validated using data for the city of 
Vienna from 1981 to 2001. Guzman describes the calibration and validation methods and data for MARS-
Madrid (25). The MARS model works with a significant level of aggregation and makes long-term 
assessments. The model uses external forecasts for economic growth, demographic trends and car 
ownership obtained from the Regional Institute of Statistics of the Region of Madrid (36) and is showed 
in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2. PROJECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES [2011=1.0] 
The MARS-Madrid model has been calibrated for the regional and metropolitan area of Madrid 
(MARS-Madrid). Table 2 shows the modal split data that were used in the calibration of MARS-Madrid 
for the base year. The modal split for both commuting trips (home-work) and other trips (home-other) is 
calculated using the Madrid 2004 mobility survey (37). Other data inputs that were used in the project 
include: 
• Constant travel time budget: 87 min (37). 
• Average trips by worker: 2.04. 
• Time value (commuting and other at prices 2004): 10.45 €/h and 5.70 €/h (38). 
TABLE 2. MODAL SPLIT CALIBRATION DATA 
Mode Commuting trips Other trips Total 
Slow 12.3% 24.2% 20.5% 
Bus 15.7% 18.2% 17.4% 
Rail 26.3% 19.3% 21.5% 
Car 45.7% 38.3% 40.6% 
The cost unit values for externalities (Table 3) were obtained from the European Project 
"Developing Harmonized European Approaches for Transport Costing and Project Assessment" (39). As 
shown in the above equation, the investment costs are not taken into account. 
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED EMISSIONS VALUE AND CASUALTIES AVOIDED 
Year Avg. C02 value Avg. NOx value Avg. PMio value 
2004-2009 22 








Note: all costs are in prices 2004 (€) 
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The Optimization Process 
The optimization process enables the level of intensity of the application of certain transport policies to be 
defined. Optimization techniques have been an important field of research in transportation planning (40), 
(41), (42), (43), (44), (45), (46), (17). This paper focuses on the method developed by Powell in 1964 
(47). This method is an algorithm that searches for a local minimum/maximum of OF for a set of linearly 
independent direction vectors without calculating the derivatives. A detailed discussion of the algorithm is 
given in Brent (48), and the complete algorithm is given in Press et al. (49). 
The procedure of the optimization process can search through a large space of parameter values 
looking for optimal solutions. Firstly, it is necessary to define the OF you want to optimize. An efficient 
hill climbing algorithm searches through the parameter space looking for the best cumulative objective 
function value. Secondly, the constants of the model are chosen. Thirdly, the optimization process finds 
the values for those parameters that optimize the objective function (23). 
This method can be applied to optimize several types of transport and land-use policies; however 
in this case, the optimization process to choose the best transport policy levels (i.e. toll value) is proposed 
with an application of two variables: a toll-pricing policy profile for passenger vehicles (initial and final 
toll value) in Madrid city center. The introduction of the concept of "policy profiles" allows specifying 
policy instrument levels and optimized them for two points over time. 
We develop scenarios that simulate specific "policy profiles": each policy can in fact be 
implemented with different characteristics over time: we define the main characteristics of a policy profile 
through X(tA) and X(t,J as the levels of the policy attributes respectively in the initial year tA (the value of 
the policy when it is introduced) and in the short, medium and long-run (the final policy value after the 
intermediate adjustments). Similarly, tA is the year in which the policy is introduced (tA =2012 in this 
study) and tL identifies the end of the evaluation period on which the policy is evaluated (/, =2017, 2022 
or 2034, according the scenario). The levels of instrument in intermediate years X{t) are determined by 
interpolating a linear function, and the level is then assumed constant for any year after the tL year as 
depicted in Figure 3. 
A, 













U ts tL tH Year t 
FIGURE 3. INSTRUMENT PROFILE FOR CONTINUOUS INSTRUMENTS. 
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THE WELFARE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
The OF identified with the social welfare function assembles the strategic variables that have been 
optimized. The objective function of the LUTI model is the welfare function (WF), including the sum of 
all social benefits optimized throughout the complete period of time. 
Thus the WF showed in Eq. (1) measures the change in social welfare compared to the do-
nothing scenario (reference scenario). This function is defined by the following elements: the change in 
consumer surplus (ACSljm), which includes either the monetary costs (or savings) and time savings for 
users, resulting through the implementation of strategy X. The variation of the operator benefits (A0ljm) 
includes gains linked to revenues from fares and charges. The change of government benefits (AGljm) 
includes fuel tax revenues, and investment savings related with road costs maintenance. Finally, the 
variation of benefits for the society related with the external costs (AEljm) includes reduction of accidents, 
greenhouse gas emissions and pollution costs. 
WF = luiijmkva + ruy) • ACS i y m ( t ) + ( 1 / ( 1 + r 0 ) t ) • AO i j m(t) + ( 1 / ( 1 + rgY) • 
AG i jm(t) + (1/(1 + re) t) • AE i jm(t)] (1) 
The final evaluation is expressed by net present value (NPV) over the different scenarios, and 
using different discount rates (/'„, ra, rg, re,) according with the considered social agents (users, operators, 
government, society). The government and the society social discount rate in this paper will be the same. 
The variable t represent the period of time. The variable m is the transport mode. The /' and j subscripts 
refer to origin and destination zones, respectively. 
It is well known that the consumer surplus from a change in travel times and/or travel costs 
should in general be calculated at the level of origin-destination pairs. 
ACSjym(t) ~ ~'Zt'Zijm[Tijm(. t) + ( 0 ] " [G(°ym(t) - Gfjm(t)] 
* l2ItIipn[Tum(t) + njm(t)} • (Cljm(t) + tfjm(t) • VOT[ - C?jm(t) - t ° - m ( t ) • VOTt) (2) 
Where f l j m is the demand for trips between i and j by mode m, in the k scenario; G ijm is travel 
generalized cost; CkiJm is total travel cost including charging and operation cost; ikljm is the travel time; and 
VOT1 is the value of time. The superscript k is used to denote either the do-nothing scenario (k=0) or the 
scenario that is tested (k= 1). 
Consumer surplus (i.e., the difference between user utility and its cost) implied a higher consideration for 
the high income users because it increases with the income of users. In other words, the consumer surplus 
of high income people has a higher weight with respect of the low income people. In this work, the 
income of people is included in the user utility, to partially correct this possible distortion. Travel cost 
Ckijm includes the cost of charging (like a congestion toll or parking charging) and operation costs, as 
shown in Eq. (3). 
^ ( 0 = ^ ( 0 + ^ ( 0 (3) 
Where is the operation costs (including fuel) between i and j by mode m, in the k scenario; 
and r (;n, is the cost of road charging. The operators' cost is calculated by Eq. (4) and shows the value of 
net benefits to operators, including public transportation (PT) fares and toll and parking revenues (17). 
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MLJm (t) = I t lijm Tijm(0 • h V X O + c}rm(t)] - r ° ? „ ( 0 • [/?°,„(0 + eg.m(t )] (4) 
/<l|m consists in two parts, one is revenue from private vehicles in the case of an urban toll or 
parking charge fee; another part is constituted by the revenue collected from public transport services, e.g. 
trip tickets, while C,, represents the cost of administration, operation and maintenances costs. 
Equation (5) represents the government's benefits or losses resulting from changes of fuel tax 
revenue (AF„) and the variation of the cost of road maintenance (AM,,). Finally, equation (6) represents 
the value of external costs, associated with green-house gas emissions (AGHE,,). air pollution (AP„) and 
road safety (AS,,). 
AGijmit) = It Iijm[T^Jm(t) - r ° , „ ( 0 ] • [Fijm + Mijm] (5) 
A % n ( 0 = I t I i j m [ T l J m ( t ) - T°Jm(t)] • [GHEijm(t) + PLjm(t) + Sijm(t)] (6) 
Equations (2), (4), (5) and (6), represents each agent and their costs and benefits and discount 
rates, are included in the equation (1). The NPV is calculated according to the discount rate for each 
agent. 
The different discount rates for each kind of social agents are defined following the micro-
economic and CBA literature (50). In general the users prefer to consume today than tomorrow (10). 
Hence, the social time preferences estimated for users is between 0.5 and 1% higher than the government 
discount rate (51). Some studies in Spain recommend a discount rate of 4.8% (51). Another studies that 
present methodologies for the design of optimal transport strategies using LUTI models in UK, use a 
discount rate of 3.5% to reflect UK practice (46) (44). Actually, the society is the social agent having the 
higher preference for the future generation, having a discount rate lower than the current users. Hence the 
considered discount rate for users is 5.5%, while for government is 4.5% (52). Finally, the operators' 
discount rate is related with the expected investment value, i.e. between 7% and 10% (53). 
MADRID CASE DESCRIPTION 
The Madrid city center area is about 54.8 km2. In 2004, around 250,000 of the inhabitants of this area 
travel by car to their workplaces outside the cordon. Additionally, almost 260,000 people live outside the 
cordon and have their workplaces inside, and commute by car from outside to inside of the cordon area 
(54). Figure 4 shows the basic geographical information used in the model. 
The MARS- Madrid model includes 90 zones covering the whole region, 61 of which correspond 
to urban and metropolitan areas. The cordon area defines a zone of the city in which access is restricted to 
private vehicles, in order to reduce pollutant emissions in the center of Madrid. For this case the zone 
selected as a trial was the area inside the ring road known as the M-30 (Figure 4). The area of study has a 
high provision of public transportation, both in terms of coverage and service. In the forecast scenarios, 
projections were made for economic and population growth based on data from the Institute of Statistics 
in Madrid (36). 
It is presumed that tolls are automatically charged to drivers as they pass -without stopping-
through several toll barriers located as shown in Figure 4. The transportation cost of each pair ij of the 
network is considered as a vector having two components: the monetary cost and the monetary value of 
time, which measure the subjectively-perceived expense of a journey using generalized costs weighted by 
exponential functions of the user's perception. It is also assumed that the toll-road user will pay the same 
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toll regardless of the car type or the resident zone in which he lives (except for CBD residents). In the do-
nothing scenario there is no toll to pay for travel to the city center. 
Madrid Region Toll&Parking Scheme Area (CBD) 
Tolled Zone Rest of Modeled Area Modeled Area 
CBD Periphery Metropolitan Ring Regional Ring Total 
Population 1.013.364 2.256.497 2.722.751 501.891 6.494.503 
Workplaces 443.370 1.000.630 531.395 92.561 2.073.956 
Area (km:) 41,18 565,20 2.272,60 5.151,70 8.031 
Modal Split (PC/PT) [%] 43/57 42/58 68/32 89/11 52/48 
Car/1,000 inhabitants 438,18 388,68 521,39 816,81 511,96 
FIGURE 4. MODELED AREA AND CITY CENTER AREA - MADRID. 
SCENARIOS DEFINITION 
In order to explore the optimal toll scheme values under different discount rates and time horizons, an 
integrated framework was proposed seeking the maximum social welfare. These dimensions were 
compared with business-as-usual alternatives (labeled the do-nothing scenario), where no policy measures 
were assumed. This scenario includes only infrastructures built in 2012 and does not consider any 
intervention during evaluation periods. Under a do-nothing scenario, the social welfare variation is 
assumed to be zero. Do-nothing scenario is needed to quantify the impact of transportation policies. The 
optimum toll value obtained in alternative scenario behind the condition of the maximization of the NPV 
of the WF proposed will measure the social welfare compared to the reference scenario. 
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By combining discount rates and time periods, the scenario framework is defined. Hence, six 
groups of scenarios were identified (the first three for the same rates for all social agents, and 4, 5 and 6 
for different discount rates for each agent) for metropolitan area of Madrid: 





year Discount rates (ra) 
tA tL Users Operators Government Externalities 
Same rates and short term [SR-ST] 2012 2017 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
Same rates and medium term [SR-MT] 2012 2022 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
Same rates and long term [SR-LT] 2012 2034 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
Different rates and short term [DR-ST] 2012 2017 5.5% 7.0% 4.5% 4.5% 
Different rates and medium term [DR-MT] 2012 2022 5.5% 7.0% 4.5% 4.5% 
Different rates and long term [DR-LT] 2012 2034 5.5% 7.0% 4.5% 4.5% 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
As expected, car traffic entering the cordon zone is reduced at the end of the time period (2017, 
2022 and 2034). There is a modal shift from car to PT in radial trips (periphery to center). This modal 
shift results in a PT fare revenue surplus. In addition, the capacity surplus produces a scenario with lower 
congestion in radial corridors (Figure 4). The increasing speed improves the trip time for car users, as 
well as for road-shared PT services. A general time savings for private and PT users is generated. 
However, a percentage of radial car trips (between 3 and 5%, according to the scenario) have changed 
their destination pattern, intensifying the loss of attractiveness of the tolled city center compared to the 
rest of the region. In the case of internal city center mobility, the current scenario produces a reduction of 
the use of roads in the city center that decreases the delays. The main consequence is an increasing of car 
use by the city center residents excluded from paying atoll. These dynamics may require an adaptation of 
the tolling scheme or it may need to be complemented with other transport policies, e.g., a new parking 
scheme (55). Table 5 summarizes the optimal strategies for the welfare function maximization. 
The WF optimal strategy shows a general positive social welfare enough to cover the generated 
costs. Even if the general losing agent is the car user for whom the increased saving time is not enough to 
cover the monetary costs. This effect is more visible if we analyse the situation at local scale, comparing 
users characterized by different income and spatial localization. The people from the low income district 
of Madrid City (Usera district with 1,200€ for household per month) lose more benefits, around 65-75% 
with respect to richest zones, while the users with the higher income (3,500€ for household per month) 
didn't change their pattern's schemes and their costs increase less compared to the time saving they 
realize. A municipality quite far from the city center of Madrid and from the tolled area, characterized by 
a quite high income (3,000 € for household per month, like Pinto, see Figure 5), is less affected by the 
congestion charge because of the lower use of the tolled area and a quite high income. This first funding 
seems to say that the congestion pricing is a regressive policy measure. 
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TABLE 5. SURPLUS ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO/REFERENCE SCENARIO OF THE 
MADRID ROAD CHARGE SCHEME FOR THE OPTIMAL TOLL VALUE [NPV M€] 
Scenario [SR-ST] [SR-MT] [SR-LT] [DR-ST] [DR-MT] [DR-LT] 
Welfare (M€) 93.57 169.18 309.11 74.85 119.08 167.58 
Toll value 
optimum 
Year tA 11 tA 11 tA 11 tA 11 tA 11 tA tL 2012 2017 2012 2022 2012 2034 2012 2017 2012 2022 2012 2034 
Value (€) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tj) 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.5 2.5 1.7 2.2 2.3 0.2 
Users (M€) 
Time savings 
Car users 126.10 232.73 418.64 124.43 211.07 285.64 
PT users 93.67 169.79 290.40 92.60 153.72 201.59 
Money savings 
Car users -483.91 -891.37 -1,556.11 -484.36 -788.94 -995.88 
PT users 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total benefit users -264.14 -488.85 -847.07 -267.33 -424.15 -508.66 
Operators (M€) 
PT fares revenue 18.32 33.26 56.32 17.49 27.84 34.58 
Parking charges revenues -97.98 -176.56 -298.92 -94.17 -147.32 -180.94 
Congestion pricing 
revenues 453.22 830.39 1,451.61 434.96 690.08 859.41 
Total benefit operators 373.56 687.09 1,209.32 358.28 570.59 713.04 
Government (M€) 
Fuel tax revenues -18.35 -34.10 -63.65 -18.76 -32.10 -43.80 
Road maintenance costs 1.90 3.53 6.38 1.95 3.27 4.24 
Total benefits government -16.45 -30.57 -57.28 -16.81 -28.82 -39.53 
Externalities (M€) 
Environmental benefits 3.53 6.80 13.41 3.62 6.38 8.91 
Accidents costs -2.93 -5.29 -9.27 -2.91 -4.93 -6.15 
Total benefit externalities 0.60 1.51 4.14 0.71 1.46 2.76 
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Usera District (Low 
income zone 1,200 
Pinto municipality 
income zone 3,000 
-2 to -1 M€ 
-1 to 0 M€ 
>0M€ 
Users Benefits Madrid Region by Zone 
NPV2017 (same rates) 
Colmenar municipality 
(High income zone 
3.500 €) 
Users Benefits Madrid Region by Zone 
NPV 2017 (different rates) 
< - 6 M€ 
-6 to -3 M€ 
-3 to -2 M€ 
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FIGURE 5. USERS BENEFITS BY ZONE AND SCENARIO 
The time saving, is significant after the cordon toll implementation. The increased accident rate 
caused by a higher speed in the charging area leads to higher accident costs. Anyway travelers pay a 
higher price (time and costs including the pricing policy) than the time costs they save with the 
congestion pricing. Total social welfare is positive because the operators" revenue collection dominates 
travelers" surplus reduction. These results highlight that this policy may have a strong social opposition as 
user surplus in negative. Nevertheless, the real case of congestion pricing shows an increasing 
acceptability of an urban congestion toll (56). The main reason is the jointly implementation of a public 
transportation policy that increase PT services and pay a major attention to the more losing zones. 
Congestion pricing schemes generate significant positive present value of revenue which may lead to 
promote complementary public transport measures compensating the increasing generalized costs for 
users. 
Comparing the results between the optimization process using same rate or different rates among 
social agents, we observe that in general the use of discount rates following the suitable social time 
preferences for each kind of actors decreases the social welfare in the medium and long terms. The short 
term, seems to be the same. The use of different discount rates for agents shows that the optimal value for 
toll is strongly decreasing with respect to the use of the same discount rate. As above said a positive social 
welfare is generated because toll charges revenues dominates the travelers" surplus reduction. But, as the 
value of potential future revenues for operators decreases in time faster than the disutility to users because 
of the differences on time preferences (translated into different discount rates), the tolling scheme 
undergoes a relevant change through de different DR-n scenarios. Values for X(tA) and X(t,J vary from 
1.5-2.5 € at the DR-ST scenario to 2.3-0.2 € for the DR-LT scenario. Individual user interests gain weight 
on the welfare function as operator interests for future decline. The expected revenues decline over time 
so optimal toll value will trend to reduce negative effects on user surplus rather to improve the capability 
to generate new incomes. This drives to the pronounced change over time in the tolling scheme. 
Consequently, the loss in terms of NPV for users and government is decreasing, and there is a gain for the 
operators. Although benefits and costs (B/C) ratios obtained in all optimal scenarios are nearly constant. 
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This is a very important advance in the literature of the CBA analysis implemented to appraise 
transport policies: the use of the real social inter-temporal preference rate for each actor represents at 
more realistic utility of each social actor. A future development could be the introduction of different 
discount rates with respect of the different groups of users, or government or operators. 
From a time perspective of marginal changes of social welfare, it declines overtime for all 
scenarios (Figure 6). This trend is more pronounced when we apply different discount rates (DR 
scenarios). Individual user interests prevail over the rest of agents, especially over the interest of operators 
in creating new revenues due to his higher discount rate that undervalue future gains. This causes an 
inconsistency of the policy between operators and the rest of social agents. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Discounting future benefits and costs is almost universal in CBA approach. In general, future benefits and 
costs receive smaller weight than the imminent ones. The chosen discount rates determine the magnitude 
of the difference between current and future costs/benefits. Different agents with different time 
preferences, risk, and opportunity may be affected by transportation projects. Therefore using a unique 
discount rate to homogenize time dependent costs and benefits in a social welfare may be inaccurate. This 
research looks to identify whether the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actors had an 
effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. At the same time, different 
conclusions regarding impacts of the policy are also revealed. 
The following four conclusions could be addressed: 
1. Optimal congestion pricing increases the costs of passenger vehicle use and therefore 
reduces the traffic volume, especially for periphery-CBD trips. This in turn increases demand for PT as 
well as reduces travel time for all traffic flows. Hence, congestion pricing leads to an improvement in 
environmental conditions as it reduces passenger private vehicle traffic. In general, the total social benefit 
for cordon toll scheme is positive in all scenarios. Even though in all cases, optimal congestion pricing 
scheme produce a decreasing consumer surplus, especially for lower income people. 
2. When different discount rates are applied, shortsightedness by operators with its higher 
discount rate appears inconsistent with community expectations with a lower discount rate. If no other 
measure is deployed in order to recycle operator surplus obtained into users, the usefulness of the measure 
of congestion toll declines over time. This leads to an optimal tolling scheme in the scenario DR-LT 
where the toll decreases nearly to zero in the long term as individual preferences gains over potential 
expected revenues of operators. 
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3. If the revenue from a congestion toll is not returned to users, the social welfare declines. 
In particular, when all road users suffer identically from a delay and the toll revenue is not recycled in 
favor of the users, the toll just reduces users' welfare and this may lead, not only to a social unacceptable 
measure but to an ineffective measure from a social welfare point of view. However, congestion pricing 
have an important role for city planners. Other transport measures, improving PT measures for example, 
may have a positive user surplus at the expenses of generating negative financial impacts on operators 
which may lead to increase subsidies to PT. Revenues from congestion pricing may be recycled to cover 
these subsidies required making both measures complementary. Instruments may mutually reinforce as 
the effectiveness, acceptability and economic support are improved. The acceptability problem of the 
congestion charge is overcome and mitigated. Added to this, congestion pricing instrument may finance 
complementary instruments and, thus, subsidization is less necessary if congestion pricing are in place. 
This highlights the need for planners in the packaging of different policy instruments to form an overall 
strategy. Moreover, if complementary measures were optimized jointly, an optimal level for recycling 
revenues from congestion pricing would be achieved. 
4. A social welfare analysis from a geographical point of view illustrates that aggregate 
social welfare as a sum of surpluses ignores equity issues, which may be socially unacceptable because 
tolls penalize some people for the benefit of others. The analysis showed that the charge discourages car 
trips of lower income travelers more than the trips of higher incomes people. Toll revenues can be used to 
compensate those who might otherwise "lose" as a result of congestion pricing. Without recycling of the 
toll revenues, the congestion toll is definitely a regressive measure. Recycling revenues is thus a way of 
redistribution of wealth. 
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